In the 2015 Paris climate change agreement, each Party sets its own mitigation target by submitting a so-called Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC). An important question is whether including conditional components in INDCs might enhance the agreement's e¤ ectiveness. We report the results of a closely controlled laboratory experiment that might help answer this question. The experiment investigates how two factors in ‡uence the e¤ ectiveness of leadership by (intrinsically) conditional commitments. We …nd that it may help if the leader's conditional promise is credible, that is, if followers have reason to believe that ful…lling the leader's condition will actually cause the leader's promise to be implemented. Moreover, it may also help if the leader, by implementing its conditional promise, is able to in ‡uence the followers' welfare substantially. Importantly, however, for both factors we …nd a signi…cant e¤ ect only if the leader does not reap disproportionate gains from the group's collective e¤ orts
Introduction
In the 2015 Paris agreement under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, each Party sets its own mitigation target by submitting a so-called Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC). The draft negotiation text includes competing suggestions regarding whether INDCs may contain conditional components (UNFCCC 2015, paragraph 26.1) . If permitted, conditions might be expressed in two main ways. Intrinsic conditions would make own commitments conditional on other countries'mitigation e¤orts. In contrast, extrinsic conditions would make own commitments conditional on other countries' non-mitigation e¤orts, such as …nan-cial and technological support. An important question is whether intrinsic conditions, extrinsic conditions, or both, might enhance the e¤ectiveness of the 2015 Paris agreement.
While extrinsic conditions have …gured prominently in the UNFCCC in relation to action by developing countries, 1 intrinsic conditions -the focus of this paper -have less of a record in climate negotiations. However, as part of their 2020 pledges under the Cancun agreement, the European Union and Norway promised to cut emissions an additional 10% conditional on strong mitigation commitments by other Parties (UNFCCC 2011b). These intrinsically conditional commitments apparently had little (if any) e¤ect on other countries; hence, they were not implemented. The EU countries and Norway have not, at the time of writing, presented conditional commitments for the 2015 agreement, but they have left the door open for doing so later in the process by formulating their INDCs as at least 40% reductions.
Moreover, intrinsically conditional commitments constitute a central element in David Victor's (2011) club approach to climate cooperation outside the UNFCCC. Victor (2011) suggests that cooperation should begin with agreements between small groups of enthusiastic countries. The backbone of his approach is a series of conditional o¤ers, whereby enthusiastic countries would outline what they are willing and able to do, conditional on what other enthusiastic governments o¤er and implement. Moreover, reluctant countries would be enticed to join via "exclusive and contingent" measures, such as preferential market access for club members. Hence, an important question concerning climate cooperation both inside and outside the UN-FCCC process is whether and, if so, under which conditions countries might enhance cooperation through leadership based on intrinsically conditional commitments.
We present results from a closely controlled laboratory experiment that might help inform the conditionality debate. The basic preference con…guration underlying the INDC process resembles the one found in one of the most widely studied games in experiments, the voluntary contribution mechanism game, also known as the public good game. We study a novel variation of this game to assess how two factors in ‡uence the e¤ectiveness of leadership by intrinsically conditional commitments.
3 First, it may help if the leader's conditional promise is credible, that is, if followers have reason to believe that ful…lling the leader's stated condition will actually cause the leader's promise to be implemented. Second, it may also help if the leader has the ability to in ‡uence the followers'welfare substantially by implementing its conditional promise.
For both factors we …nd a signi…cant e¤ect only if the leader does not reap disproportionate gains from the group's collective e¤orts. This …nding supports recent results from research on simultaneous-move public good games with punishment opportunities. These results show that 1 For example, the Cancun agreement states that developing countries' mitigation shall be « supported and enabled by technology, …nancing, and capacity-building» (UNFCCC 2011a). 2 Victor 2011 also suggests that agreements should (a) be nonbinding, (b) entail high ‡exibility concerning choice of policy strategies, and (c) focus on policies that governments actually control, rather than on emission levels (which in large part depend on factors beyond governmental control).
3 These conditions resemble the corresponding conditions necessary for a threat to be e¤ective (e.g., Schelling 1960). Weischer et al. (2011) elaborate on the conditions for a promise to be e¤ective in the context of climate change.
e¢ cient contribution norms do not easily evolve in groups where some members bene…t signi…-cantly more than others from collective e¤orts. We also …nd that the outcome remains severely suboptimal even under favorable conditions. Thus, it seems that if leadership by conditional commitments is to bring about e¢ cient mitigation levels, it must be supplemented by other measures.
To the best of our knowledge, our experiment is the …rst one to study leadership by conditional commitments systematically. The environment we study is highly stylized: The game's structure is public knowledge; the sequence of moves, the time horizon, time periods, payo¤s, and contributions are all unambiguously de…ned; subjects can observe behavior without delay or noise; and all decisions are anonymous. This stylized environment only slightly resembles realworld settings where conditional commitments are or can be used. Thus, the external validity of our results should be checked through …eld studies-if and when relevant …eld data become available.
On the other hand, an experimental design built on a stylized environment has its advantages. Empirical …eld data from international negotiations are not only scant; they also su¤er from familiar problems such as endogeneity; selection on unobservables; omitted third variables; and reverse causality. Experiments allow randomization over treatments and truly exogenous variation in the explanatory variables; hence, the conditions (if any) under which conditional commitments might be e¤ective can be investigated by systematically manipulating the structure of interactions.
In section 2, we review relevant literature. In section 3, we provide some basic theory. In section 4, we outline our underlying model and the treatments. In section 5, we provide details about the experiment's design and implementation. In section 6, we present our results. Finally, in section 7, we conclude.
Related Literature
We review four strands of relevant literature. The …rst consists of theoretic (mostly gametheoretic) work on leadership in the form of unilateral emissions reductions. This strand o¤ers little (if any) support for the conjecture that unilateral action will induce other countries to follow suit. Using a two-country model, Hoel (1991) demonstrates that if one country (the leader) undertakes unilateral emissions reductions, the other country (the follower, which is assumed to be motivated by self-interest) may well increase its own emissions.
The reason is that the leader's unilateral action diminishes the follower's marginal bene…t of emissions reductions. Hoel also …nds that unilateral emissions reductions may cause international climate change negotiations to result in an agreement with higher total emissions than if both countries act sel…shly (in which case no unilateral action will occur).
More recent studies support Hoel's results. For example, Buchholz and coauthors (1998) …nd that other countries' free riding will likely o¤set unilateral e¤orts by one or a few countries. Thus, in their model (which closely resembles Hoel's) a coalition acting unilaterally can generate net bene…ts to its members only if it includes all major emitters.
Similarly, using a coalition model, Holtsmark (2013) shows that if one country were to announce ambitious and unconditional emissions reductions before international negotiations take place, the result would likely be higher global emissions than if the country were to make its pledge conditional on other countries'undertaking similar emissions reductions in return (Holtsmark 2013). 4 Lastly, using an incomplete-information model, Konrad and Thum (2014) …nd that a unilateral and unconditional commitment to reducing emissions diminishes the gains from global cooperation and hence makes it more di¢ cult to reach an e¤ective international agreement.
A second strand consists of game-theoretic work focusing on the prospects for transforming the climate change mitigation game from a social-dilemma game to a coordination game. The underlying assumption is that countries are much better at solving coordination games than they are at solving social-dilemma games. For example, Barrett (2003) shows how trade restrictions and technology standards might serve this function. Moreover, Barrett and Dannenberg (2012) …nd that a looming climate disaster with a known emissions threshold could create a coordination game. We show that a leader in a social-dilemma game might be able to create a coordination game for the followers through a properly designed conditional commitment.
The third strand consists of political science work that is more empirically oriented than the contributions in the …rst and second strands. While political scientists studying climate leadership and minilateralism have been more concerned with fairness than with e¤ectiveness, 5 Skodvin and Andresen (2006) present a case study of the EU's attempt to exert leadership by saving the Kyoto Protocol after the US repudiation in 2001. They conclude that, although EU leadership was instrumental for Kyoto's entry into force, the resulting agreement was a miniregime with "miniscule impact on climate change abatement". Based on a quantitative study, McLean and Stone (2012) arrive at similar conclusions: Having rati…ed the Kyoto protocol jointly, the EU countries ensured the protocol's entry into force by o¤ering selective incentives (such as EU membership or support for WTO membership) to other countries.
Combining simulations with case studies, Underdal et al. (2012) focus speci…cally on leadership by conditional commitments. They argue that such leadership can work-but only under rather strict conditions. In particular, they …nd that successful leadership requires that two conditions be ful…lled: First, the leader must promise to undertake substantial additional emissions reductions if other countries ful…ll the stated conditions. Second, the leader's promise must be credible, so that followers expect the leader to implement its promise of additional emissions reductions if (and only if) other countries ful…ll the leader's stated conditions. Finally, the fourth strand consists of a small but growing body of experimental research on leadership in public good games. It is well known that subjects' behavior in public-good experiments tends to deviate systematically from standard game-theoretic predictions, which are based on the assumptions of purely self-interested motivation and common knowledge of rationality. In particular, subjects in public-good experiments contribute and (when given the opportunity) punish substantially more than suggested by the stark zero-contribution and zeropunishment predictions of standard game theory. The reasons for these deviations have been extensively explored in the literature (see e.g., Chauduri 2011; Fehr and Gächter 2000; Kosfeld et al. 2009; McEvoy 2010; McEvoy et al. 2011; Ostrom 2000; and Ostrom et al. 1992) .
For small groups (4 to 10 subjects) and sizable marginal per capita return on contributions (MPCR between 0.30 and 0.75) group size does not signi…cantly a¤ect contribution behavior. In contrast, the MPCR, controlled for group size, signi…cantly in ‡uences contributions in smallgroup, high-MPCR settings (Isaach and Walker 1988) .
In a recent study by Weimann and coauthors (2012) , it is found that this relationship holds even for sizable groups (40 to 60 subjects) and for very low MPCRs (0.02 and 0.04). This …nding indicates that small-group behavior in the lab is also relevant for large-scale problems where the marginal bene…ts of individual contributions to a public good are negligible, as is typically the case for global emissions reductions.
tions by demonstrating such options' attractiveness to other countries. However, this alleged e¤ect would seem to presuppose that the leader has superior knowledge concerning no-regret options -a rather strong assumption.
5 See e.g., Eckersley (2012); and Maltais (2014) . Cherry et al. (2005) and Fischer et al. (1995) …nd that heterogeneously endowed subjects contribute signi…cantly less than homogenously endowed subjects do. In contrast, Reuben and Riedl (2013) …nd that both heterogeneous endowments and heterogeneous returns produce approximately a doubling of contributions relative to the contributions in homogeneous groups when no punishment is available. However, when punishments are introduced, the increase in contributions is substantially weaker with heterogeneous MPCRs than with heterogeneous endowments. The authors conclude that subjects converge on e¢ cient contribution norms even when endowments di¤er, but not when subjects bene…t unevenly from public-goods provision. According to Reuben and Riedl (2013) , uneven bene…ts give rise to con ‡icting contribution norms.
6 Such con ‡icting norms hamper cooperation. While most public-good experiments implement simultaneous moves, only a handful let one group member (the leader) make its contribution decision before the other group members (followers) do so. Güth and coauthors (2007) …nd that experiments with (unconditional) leadership trigger higher average contributions than standard public-good experiments with simultaneous moves do. This di¤erence in contributions is statistically signi…cant, yet substantially moderate. These results thus suggest that while unconditional leadership enhances cooperation, it comes nowhere near fully solving the underlying collective-action problem.
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Their conclusion is supported by Levati and coauthors (2007) , who …nd that the e¤ect of unconditional leadership is even weaker (but still signi…cant) when the subjects' endowments di¤er and this di¤erence is public knowledge.
Gächter and coauthors (2010) …nd that reciprocator types contribute signi…cantly more than self-interested types in the role of leader.
8 A substantial part of this e¤ect, however, is due to false consensus. Reciprocator types initially tend to overestimate the number of other reciprocators in the population and hence contribute substantially in the …rst round. However, they are disappointed when other followers'contributions are lower than expected. Disappointment due to false consensus may, at least partly, explain why average contributions are falling over time in the experiments such as the ones conducted by Güth and coauthors and Levati and coauthors.
In contrast, Rivas and Sutter (2011) …nd a substantial e¤ect of leadership on contributions when leaders are permitted to self-select, rather than being allocated, into the leader role. Moreover, with voluntary leadership, average contributions do not appear to be falling over time. These …ndings lend some support to the conjecture that enthusiastic leaders may make a di¤erence. However, in the set-up of Rivas and Sutter leaders are not permitted to condition their contributions on follower behavior-which is the focus of our experiment.
Of the contributions reviewed here, only the contributions by Underdal and coauthors and by Holtsmark consider leadership by conditional commitments (as we do). Using Güth et al.'s unconditional leadership treatment as baseline, we introduce several novel treatments. These treatments aim at pinpointing the conditions under which leadership by conditional commitments can or will be e¤ective. Our treatments introduce changes step by step, so that only a single experimental design element di¤ers from one treatment to the next.
Model and Treatments
Consider a three-stage one-shot game where one player is randomly selected as leader (L), while the other n 1 players are followers (F ). Each player is endowed with z k units of a numéraire good (with k = fL; F g).
In stage one, the leader decides how much of its endowment to contribute to a public account for the group. In our eight main treatments (T3 through T10), the leader can also promise to top up its contribution in stage three, provided that the followers'average contribution exceeds a minimum speci…ed by the leader.
10
In stage two, followers-having observed the leader's contribution and conditional promise (if any)-decide simultaneously how much of their endowment they will contribute to the public account; thus, player i's contribution c i must satisfy c i 2 [0; z k ]. Once made, the followers' aggregate contributions are observed by the n players.
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In stage three, the leader's contribution can be increased (unless the leader contributed its entire endowment in stage one). In some treatments, the leader is free to choose whether it will top up its contribution and, if so, by how much. In other treatments, a computer program automatically implements the leader's conditional promise whenever followers ful…ll the leader's condition. All treatments except T1 include this third stage (T1 consists of stages one and two only, and replicates Güth et al. 2007 ).
Contributions are multiplied by a factor greater than unity and less than the number of players in the group-either evenly or relative to the players'endowments (see Table 1 ). Unless a contribution can be pivotal for increasing one or more other players' contributions, it is a strictly dominant strategy to contribute zero units to the public account (assuming rationality, self-interest, and complete information).
Our 10 treatments were designed to study under what conditions leadership by conditional commitment will e¤ectively enhance followers' contributions (Table 1) . We are particularly interested in the e¤ects of (1) giving the leader the possibility to explicitly state its conditions for topping up; (2) making the leader's conditional promise binding (i.e., fully credible); (3) expanding the leader's endowment; and (4) increasing the leader's MPCR. 12 Player i's payo¤ i equals:
Here the …rst right-side term (z k ) represents player i's endowment, the second (c i ) represents player i's contribution, 13 and the third represents player i's bene…t from its own and others' contributions, with k representing the MPCR of each unit contributed to the public good. In all treatments, n = 4 and c F = 100. The values of z L , L , and F vary across treatments (see 1 0 In T1 and T2, the leader cannot make such a conditional promise. 1 1 The sequence of moves in actual climate negotiations is not …xed, but endogenous. If followers move in a predetermined sequence and promises are non-binding, a unique equilibrium exists in which no player contributes (by backwards induction). If promises are binding it exists a cooperative equilibrium in addition to the noncooperative one. With a pre-determined sequence of moves and binding promises, however, there is a unique way to play the cooperative equilibrium. This is in contrast to the case were followers move simultaneously, and were there may be multiple ways to play the cooperative equilibrium (see below).
1 2 Interpreting (3) and (4) in a climate context: A leader can be "big" in two ways; by having a large endowment, which can be interpreted as having a large capacity to emitt; and having a large marginal bene…t of a given abatment, which can be interpreted as having a large population bene…ting from it.
1 3 For the leader, c i represents the sum of its contribution in stage 1 and its contribution in stage 3. We begin by considering a situation in which the assumptions of what we might call the "standard model"apply: In this situation, it is common knowledge that all n players are rational and purely self-regarding. Based on these assumptions, what will be the game's subgame-perfect equilibrium? The answer depends on whether the leader's promise is binding.
First, consider the case where the leader's promise is nonbinding, so that in stage three, the leader is free to choose whether it will keep or violate its promise (if any) from stage one. Using backward induction we …nd that in stage three, the leader will contribute zero. The reason is that the marginal cost of contributing one unit is 1, whereas the marginal private bene…t of contributing one unit is only L (< 1). Moreover, contributing a positive amount in stage three cannot in ‡uence followers' contributions, simply because followers have no decisions to make after stage two (in the one-shot game).
In stage two, no follower will make a contribution, because F < 1 and because followers anticipate that, regardless of their decisions, the leader will contribute zero in stage three.
Finally, in stage one the leader will contribute nothing, because L < 1 and because the leader anticipates that, regardless of the leader's stage-one contribution (and promise, if any), no follower will make a contribution in stage two.
It follows that for T1 and T2 (in which the leader can make no promise at all) as well as for T3, T8, T9, and T10 (in which the leader can make only a nonbinding promise), the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of the standard model is that all n players contribute nothing. 15 Thus, in these treatments each player's equilibrium payo¤ equals its endowment z k . Because k > 1=n in our design, this subgame-perfect equilibrium is Pareto dominated by the nonequilibrium outcomes wherein all players contribute their entire endowment. Note that many such outcomes exist, because the leader can divide its contribution of z units between stage one and stage three in many di¤erent ways. 16 Backward induction shows that in a …nitely repeated game, the stage-game equilibrium will be played in every period. Thus, in T1, T2, T3, T8, T9, and T10 the subgame-perfect equilibrium in the …nitely repeated game is that all players contribute zero units in every period.
Next, turn to the case where the leader's promise is binding (T4 through T7). For this case, our experimental design makes it public knowledge that if followers ful…ll the leader's condition, then the leader's promise to make an additional contribution in stage three would be automatically implemented by the computer. In all treatments where the leader's promise is binding, cooperative equilibria exist. In particular, the leader can-by choosing its stage-one contribution and promise appropriately-create a coordination game for the followers. Denote the leader's conditional contribution b and its minimum requirement for the followers' average contribution c . Follower i's return from contributing to the public account will then equal:
where c j is follower j's contribution. Notice that follower i's return function shifts vertically at the point where i's contribution is pivotal for triggering implementation of the leader's conditional contribution. Denote this point c i . The return function is non-negative if c i ( F 1) + b F 0. Solving for b gives:
When condition (1) holds, a follower has no incentive to deviate unilaterally from c i ; hence, c i constitutes a best reply, given the other players' contributions (and the leader's promise). Dropping the subscript on c , condition (1) gives the combinations of b and c with which the leader will create a coordination game for the followers. All combinations of follower contributions that exactly meet the leader's stated minimum constitute equilibria of the stage 2 game; however, zero contributions by all players is also an equilibrium. The positive-contribution equilibria Pareto dominate the zero-contribution equilibrium whenever condition (1) is a strict inequality. However, zero contribution is the maximin strategy for followers.
Given that followers coordinate to meet c , the leader's marginal bene…t with regard to c is L (n 1) while the marginal cost is 1 L , which implies positive net marginal bene…t as long as
This condition is always satis…ed in our experiment. Furthermore, when followers fail to coordinate, the leader's marginal bene…t and marginal cost with regard to c are both zero. The leader will maximize its payo¤ by maximizing c subject to its own budget constraint, the followers'budget constraint, and condition 1. Solving yields
The numeric equilibrium solutions in terms of the leader's contribution and the required average followers'contribution are listed in Table 2 Note that more than two equilibria typically exist: unless the leader's condition requires all followers to contribute their entire endowment, the followers can take on the costs involved in satisfying the leader's stated condition in (many) di¤erent ways. Given this coordination problem, it is by no means obvious that the followers will manage to settle on any particular positive-contribution equilibrium. Treatment 6 provides an exception to the multiplicity of positive contribution equilibria. In this treatment followers are required to contribute their entire endowment in equilibrium, reducing the number of positive contribution equilibria to one. To ensure that the positive-contributions equilibrium is Pareto dominant, the leader must set the ratio of b to c higher than implied by equations (3) and (4).
The last column in Table 2 provides the sum of contributions in the positive contributions equilibrium, as a percentage of the sum of endowments. This percentage can be taken as a measure of e¢ ciency, since the payo¤s are increasing linearly in the sum of contributions. As can be seen, having high levels of e¢ ciency in public goods provision as an equilibrium phenomenon requires high leader endowments and access to a commitment technology.
Design and Implementation
As explained in the previous section, we ran 10 treatments (including the control treatment). Each treatment consisted of 16 periods. To avoid "envy e¤ects," we let each subject act as leader for four (subsequent) periods. Which subject acted as leader in which four periods was determined randomly. 17 We recruited a total of 408 subjects for the experiment, 176 subjects from the general student population at BI Norwegian Business School and 232 subjects from the general student population at Appalachian State University, Boone. The number of groups included in a session varied from 3 to 7. No subject participated in more than one session. We ran a total of 21 sessions for the experiment, striving to balance the US and Norwegian sessions over the 10 treatments. The sessions were conducted between May 2013 and May 2014.
We implemented a partner design in which the four-subject groups were formed randomly at the beginning of each treatment and remained constant for that treatment's 16 periods. Subjects only received feedback about behavior in own group. In each period, all subjects received information about the leader's contribution prior to entering stage 2. After followers had made their (simultaneous) contribution decisions in stage 2, all subjects were informed about these follower contributions. When relevant (T2-T10), all subjects were informed about the leaders stage three contribution after it had been made. Finally in the end of each period all subjects got a feedback in the form of a statistics covering decisions and payo¤s in the current and all previous periods. Subjects'anonymity was preserved throughout.
All sessions were computerized, and the experiment was programmed in z-tree (Fischbacher 2007) . In each session the administrator, having seated the subjects at randomly drawn cubicles in the lab, distributed the instructions and read them aloud. The session began after subjects had answered a set of control questions designed to ensure they understood the payo¤ structure. Each session lasted about one hour. In the experiment an Experimental Currency Unit (ECU) was used. The instructions made the exchange rate from ECU to USD or NOK public knowledge.
Subjects received their earnings, which averaged around USD 40 / NOK 250, in cash and privately, at the end of the session, which lasted on average around one hour.
Results
We present our results by way of (1) bar charts with corresponding non-parametric tests of di¤er-ences and (2) regressions. We are particularly interested in how the average follower contribution varies by treatment. In addition, we study how often the leader creates a coordination game for the followers and whether followers are able to coordinate by meeting (or exceeding) the leader's stated condition.
Average follower contribution: non-parametric tests Figure 1 shows the average follower contribution and the average leader contribution for all of our 10 treatments. Six main features stand out. First, the average follower contribution varies considerably across treatments. In particular, it is more than three times higher in treatment 6 (the maximum) than in treatment 3 (the minimum). Thus, the variables de…ning our treatments seem to in ‡uence the followers'behavior.
Second, the average leader contribution also varies considerably across treatments. Thus, the variables de…ning our treatments seem to in ‡uence the leader's behavior as well.
Third, the average follower contribution is positively correlated with the average leader contribution. This …nding suggests that the leader's behavior in ‡uences the followers'behavior (and possibly vice versa).
Fourth, the average follower contribution is not higher in treatments 2 and 3 than in treatment 1. Thus, giving the leader the opportunity to top up or to top up and make a conditional promise does not by itself enhance public-goods provision.
Fifth, and consistent with the equilibrium of our model, the average follower contribution is higher in treatments where (1) the leader has a large endowment and (2) implementation of the leader's promise is automatic, than in treatments with neither of these two features. For example, compare treatment 6 (z L =200 and automatic implementation) with treatment 3 (z L =100 and voluntary implementation). The impact of coordination is analyzed further below.
Finally, only one treatment (treatment 6) displays an average follower contribution higher than 50% of the endowment. Thus, public-goods provision remains moderate even under quite favorable conditions.
The main result is summarized in result 1:
Result 1 Leadership by conditional commitment enhances public-goods provision under some conditions, yet falls substantially short of solving the collective-action problem faced by the subjects in our experiment.
We now proceed by formally testing di¤erences between treatments with explicit conditionality (T3-T10). In particular, we focus on followers'average contributions conditioned on: (1) whether the leader's promise is binding (automatic implementation) or not binding (implementation left to the leader's discretion); (2) whether the leader's endowment is large (z L = 200) or small (z L = 100); and (3) whether the bene…ts from the public account are shared evenly ( L = 0:4) or unevenly ( L = 0:64). Table 3 .3: WRS tests of di¤ erences in average follower contribution by returns (number of groups)
First, by comparing treatments vertically in Figure 1 (T4 vs. T3; T5 vs. T8; T6 vs. T9; T7 vs. T10), we appreciate that the e¤ect of binding promises is positive except when bene…ts are unevenly distributed. Thus, being able to set forth binding promises seems to help leaders induce followers to contribute, but only if the proceeds from the public account are distributed evenly. Wilcoxon rank-sum (WRS) tests con…rm this …nding. 18 The results in Table 3 .1 show that one e¤ect (T4 vs. T3) is close to signi…cance at the 5% level, while another (T6 vs. T9) is close to signi…cance at the 10% level. Thus, binding promisess seems to have an e¤ect on average follower contributions only when bene…ts are evenly distributed.
Second, by comparing treatments that vary only concerning leader endowments in Figure 1 (T3 vs. T9; T8 vs. T10; T4 vs. T6; and T5 vs. T7), we …nd that the size of the leader's endowment has a positive e¤ect on the average follower contribution in all four cases. Table 3 .2, however, reveals that the e¤ect is marginal at best when bene…ts are unevenly distributed. WRS tests con…rm that big endowments help leaders induce followers to contribute only if proceeds are shared evenly.
Finally, by comparing treatments that vary only concerning how bene…ts are distributed in Figure 1 (T4 vs. T5; T6 vs. T7; T3 vs. T8; T9 vs. T10), we …nd that increasing the leader's MPCR (while simultaneously decreasing the MPCRs of followers) appears to have a positive e¤ect on the average follower contribution in two of the four cases (4 vs. 5; 3 vs. 8), but a negative e¤ect in the other two cases (7 vs. 6; 9 vs. 10). Table 3 .3. reveals that one e¤ect in each direction is signi…cant at the 5% level. Thus, based on Figure 1 and the WSR tests the isolated e¤ect of unevely distributed bene…ts seems indeterminate.
These three …ndings are summarized in Result 2:
Result 2 Endowment and binding promises interact with returns concerning their e¤ ect on followers' average contribution.
We now proceed to study our treatment e¤ects using regressions. Her we pay particular attention to interaction e¤ects.
Average follower contribution: regressions
In the regressions we use individual decisions as the unit of analysis with individual random e¤ects, and clustering of standard errors at the group level to control for within-group interactions.
19 Table 4 Both Endowment and Binding have a positive and signi…cant e¤ect on the average follower contribution. Top-up, Promise, and Returns have no signi…cant e¤ect in Model 1. Lab has a signi…cant positive e¤ect.
Model 2 adds two control variables: the leader's unconditional contribution in the current period and the leader's total contribution in the previous period. Because data for the latter variable is unde…ned for period 1, the number of observations is lower for Model 2 than for Model 1. Both additional controls have a positive and signi…cant e¤ect. Concerning the other variables, the most important change from Model 1 to Model 2 is that the e¤ect of Endowment declines in magnitude. However, both Binding and Endowment still have a signi…cant positive e¤ect. Thus, it seems that these two variables'e¤ect on the average follower contribution is partly mediated by the average leader contribution.
As explained in the previous section, our graphs indicate the presence of statistical interaction; hence, we also analyzed our data separately for treatments with even returns and for treatments with uneven returns. The results (Table 5) con…rm that interaction e¤ects are indeed present. With uneven returns ( L = 0:64), both Binding and Endowment have only weak positive e¤ects that are not statistically signi…cant at conventional levels. However, with even returns ( L = 0:4), each variable's e¤ect increases by a factor of about three. They also become signi…cant at all conventional levels. Concerning the controls, it is worth noting that Lab is no longer signi…cant. Finally, R-squared is higher than in any of our other regressions. on groups, does not qualitatively alter results. Inclusion of …xed-period e¤ects (alone or in addition to random e¤ects) does not qualitatively alter results either. Again, this holds both for individual decisions and for group averages as dependents, and for full sample analysis (Table 4) as well as for split sample analysis ( In summary, our regressions support results 1 and 2. In particular, they con…rm that leading by conditional commitment can enhance followers' contributions to a public good. They also con…rm that this e¤ect depends on the institutional setting. In particular, leading by conditional commitment is most likely to induce followers to contribute (more) if the leader has both credibility and ability to in ‡uence followers'payo¤ substantially, while the bene…ts from cooperation are shared evenly.
Coordination
As shown in Section 4, the leader can-by ful…lling condition (1)-create a coordination game for the followers, assuming that the leader's promise is binding. For a target of 100 ECUs in T6 it is only one way to play the positive contributions equilibrium. In treatments T4, T5, and T7 the positive contributions equilibrium requires a lower target and can be played in multiple ways. Thus, we expect leaders to set higher targets more frequently in T6 than in the other three treatments with binding promises. Figure 2 displays the cumulative frequency of targets for the four treatments with binding promises. As can be seen, higher targets are set on average in T6 than in T4, T5, and T7. Indeed, while almost 30% of the targets in T6 are 90 ECUs or higher, only 2-12% of the targets in the three other treatments are at or above this level. (1) is ful…lled and followers meet or exceed the leader's target. Figure 3 shows that condition 1 is met more often when returns are distributed evenly than when returns are distributed unevenly (compare T4 vs. T5, T6 vs. T7, T3 vs. T8, and T9 vs. T10). The reason is that condition 1 requires a larger promise-target ratio when returns are distributed unevenly. The …gure also shows that condition 1 is met more often when the leader's endowment is large than when it is small (compare T4 vs. T6, T5 vs. T7, T3 vs. T9, and T8 vs. T10). In contrast, whether the promise is binding has no systematic e¤ect on whether condition 1 is met. However, the fact that equilibria with positive contributions exist only when promises are binding is re ‡ected in the followers' behavior: Binding commitments have a huge e¤ect on whether the followers meet (or exceed) the target (compare treatments vertically). In addition, the size of the leader's endowment also a¤ects whether the followers meet (or exceed) the target. Hence, it seems that the ability to in ‡uence followers' welfare substantially is important both because it a¤ects the size of the leader's promise and because it a¤ects how followers respond. In contrast, credibility is important largely because it generates equilibria with positive contributions, thereby causing followers to contribute more.
Result 3 Leaders with a large endowment tend to promise more than do leaders with a small endowment. Followers tend to meet the leader's condition more often when the leader has a large endowment and when the leader's promise is credible.
Conclusions
Our results suggest that two factors in ‡uence the prospects for leadership by conditional commitments to enhance cooperation. First, it helps if the leader's promise is credible, that is, if followers have reason to believe that ful…lling the leader's stated condition will cause the leader to actually implement the promise. Without such credibility, the followers'incentive to ful…ll the leader's condition is diluted. Second, it also helps if the leader has a large endowment, that is, if it has the ability to in ‡uence followers' welfare substantially. Indeed, unless the leader has such ability, followers cannot bene…t by joining forces to ful…ll the leader's condition-even when the leader's promise is credible. Each factor's e¤ect, however, is present only if the leader does not reap disproportionate gains from the group's collective e¤orts-a result that concurs with previous …ndings from experimental work on simultaneous-move public-good games with punishment opportunities. These previous …ndings show that e¢ cient contribution norms do not easily evolve in groups where some members bene…t signi…cantly more from cooperation than others do.
Our results shed some light on why the EU's conditional commitment under the Cancun agreement largely failed to induce other major emitting countries to reciprocate. As argued by Underdal et al. (2012: 485) , the EU's conditional promise to raise emissions reductions from 20% to 30% below 1990 levels may well have been credible. However, only about 11% of global emissions come from sources within the EU countries.
20 Thus, the di¤erence between reducing EU emissions 30% and reducing them 20% corresponds to an additional reduction of global emissions of only about 1%. It is thus understandable that other major emitting countries have shown little interest in undertaking substantial and costly additional emissions reductions to secure such a modest global e¤ect. In addition, these other major emitting countries face huge coordination problems in ful…lling the EU's stated condition. First, the costs of ful…lling this condition could likely be split in many di¤erent ways (however, it is hard to be sure, because the EU's stated condition is rather vague). And second, many competing norms exist concerning what is a fair division of the required mitigation burden. Thus, even if all other major emitting countries were to desire joint action to ful…ll the EU's condition (which is unlikely), competing contribution norms might well undermine their ability to actually undertake such joint action. These obstacles likely apply in the INDC process as well, meaning that intrinsically conditional commitments are unlikely to facilitate ambition in the 2015 agreement. Our result that leverage matters suggests that the country most likely to in ‡uence others through conditional commitments is China, whose emissions are nearly three times those of the EU.
Our experiment suggests that the e¤ect of leading by conditional commitments is limited even under favorable circumstances. In particular, leading by conditional commitment does not even come close to fully solving the underlying collective-action problem in any of our experimental treatments. At best, it motivates followers to contribute around half their endowment on average, so the outcome invariably remains severely suboptimal. However, although our results indicate that leadership through intrinsically conditional commitments cannot overcome the problem of climate change, they also suggest that such leadership might serve as one helpful element in a bigger package of measures. A bigger package is exactly what Victor (2011) advocates.
